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LAW REVIEW
Vol. 30 NOVEMBER, 1951 No. i
THE REQUIREMENT OF EXACTNESS IN THE JUSTIFICA-
TION OF PRICE AND SERVICE DIFFERENTIALS
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
RALPH F. FucHs*
I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
A long road and two economic revolutions lie between the policies
as to price which accompanied the rise of the early common law and
those that find expression in the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936.1 Those
who were concerned with medieval markets, where craftsmen or traders
brought their wares, were unfamiliar with the impersonal commodity
exchanges of modern times or with "discrimination" and f.o.b. pricing,
which presuppose announced or quoted prices and an available trans-
portation system. Personal higgling and delivered pricing were the
order of the day.2 The price in a particular transaction or class of
transactions was "just," fair, or reasonable, as it was required to be,
for either of three reasons: because it was established by authority,
was in accord with custom, or, increasingly, was agreed upon by the
parties.3
*Professor of Law, Indiana University. The author records his thanks to members
of his 1949-50 seminar in Antitrust at Indiana University, who made inquiries into
some phases of this subject, and particularly to Owen Sheridan, Esq., who prepared
helpful material on the accounting aspects.
149 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1946).
2Watkins, Price Discrimination in 12 ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 350 (1934).
3As to the medieval ideology with regard to price, which was evolved by theo-
logians and perfected by St. Thomas Aquinas, see AsHLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THEon'r, PART I 132-48 (4th ed. 1919). According
to this ideology, a price should be sufficient to maintain those whose services entered
into a product according to their stations in life, and no more. Like modern economic
theory, however (see Gordon, Short-period Price Determination in Theory and
Practice, 38 AM. EcoN. lEv. 265 [1948]), the medieval theory was far removed
from day-to-day happenings, however valuable it might have been as a statement
of ideals or of long-term trends. Even price-fixing legislation, which was common,
did not embody it in any recognizable way. "The more the enactments are examined,
the more does it become clear that they are based, not on the Aristotelian doctrine of
moralists but on practical experience of bargaining about different kinds of com-
modities in the market or the fair." CUNNINGHAM, THE GnowTH OF ENGLISH IN-
DUSTRY AND COMMERCE DUIING THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES 250 (1890). As to the
rise of competition as a determining factor, see id. at 405-07.
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The widened markets brought by the Commercial Revolution intro-
duced competition for business among sellers and among buyers in
place of custom and the higgling of parties as the principal determi-
nant of prices; and its seeming inexorability identified it in the minds
of men with economic "laws." These were supposed to operate per-
fectly when conditions were favorable, but sometimes with temporary
distortion, to produce prices that were economically "right." Accord-
ing to recent theory, prices reach "equilibrium" at levels which match
marginal production costs with marginal consumer monetary demand.
As the development of communication took place, it facilitated price
offers and quotations and enhanced the expectation that prices in
different transactions in wide markets for the same commodities would
be uniform.
The Industrial Revolution with its attendant growth of large cor-
porations and reduction in the number of traders in many commodities,
however, brought into prominence new situations in which competition
among sellers and among buyers failed to hold prices in line. There
arose, rather, new forms of manipulation by powerful dealers, yield-
ing significant advantage not only in single transactions but over
periods of time. These advantages became of especial public concern
when, as was frequently the case, they tended toward monopoly in
the hands of traders able to strengthen their market positions by reason
of the concessions they gave or received.4 Apart from this factor, how-
ever, the ethical conception of equal treatment for all, which attached
itself to the "one-price" norm, called to an undefined extent for vindi-
cation as against contrary practices."
4The receipt of railroad rate rebates and favorable prices from suppliers which
characterized the rise of the "trusts," and their use of local price cutting to squeeze
out smaller competitors, are a familiar feature of the history of American trusts and
monopolies. See Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 COL. L.
REV. 179, 245-50 (1932), for a summary of this and other aspects of those business
combinations that were challenged under the anti-trust laws during the first 40
years after enactment of the Sherman Act.
5 The significance of this factor is hard to estimate. It is hardly as strong else-
where as in retail trade.' Appeals are occasionally made, however, to "good old-
fashioned competition in which a seller reduces his mill or shop prices, uniformly,
to all buyers in order to find a selling outlet. This is real competition. It is good
and honest competion." Testimony of Rankin Peck, President, National Congress of
Petroleum Retailers, Hearings before House Select Committee on Small Business on
Functional Operation of the Federal Trade Commission, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 92
(1950). On the other hand. selling or buying goods opportunistically to the best ad-
vantage wherever opportunity offers, regardless of equality, is a time-honored
practice. See the example given in Fulda, Food Distribution in the United States, the
Struggle Between Independents and Chains, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1109 (1951).
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The story has often been told of the enactment first of Section 2 of
the Clayton Act 6 and then of the amendatory Robinson-Patman Act7
in an effort to control discriminatory pricing in interstate commerce
having a bearing on the monopoly problem. Less familiar, but emerg-
ing with increasing clarity in recent discussions, are certain operative
factors attendant upon the resulting rule of price equality, except as
specifically justified, under this legislation. These bring into sharp
focus the questions of whether a material sacrifice is to be made by
consumers in order to maintain an orderly competitive system under
the rule and, if so, what the extent of the sacrifice is to be. To these
factors attention will be given here. Primary attention will be given
to proceedings of the Federal Trade Commission, upon which the
principal burden of enforcing the Act falls.
II. THE TERMS OF THE STATUTE
The intent of the statute seems clear from its wording. Sellers of
commodities in interstate commerce are not to discriminate in price
among purchasers of like grade and quality, "where the effect . . .
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent
competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them"; but "differentials which make only due allowance for differ-
ences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the
differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered" are permitted.8 Payments are not to be
made or contracted to be made by sellers to purchasers of commodities
in interstate commerce for "services or facilities furnished by or
through" the customer in the "processing, handling, sale, or offering
6The original provision, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), was directed primarily against preda-
tory, discriminatory price-cutting by sellers which enabled them to capture customers
from competitors without a general lowering of the seller's prices on the same
products. AUSTIN, Paicp DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROLEMS UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr 6 (1950). The provision was, however, held to be broad
enough to outlaw discrimination which tended to create a monopoly on the part of
a favored buyer. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S.
245 (1929).7The drive for this legislation came from the participants in the "orthodox" chan-
nels of distribution (wholesalers, retailers, and brokers) who desired protection
against various forms of price concessions by manufacturers and processors to large
buyers, representing alternative channels of distribution-notably chain stores and
mail order houses, which were absorbing an increasing share of available business.
AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 7-11; Fulda, supra note 5, at 1082-1109; Gould,
Legislative Intervention in the Conflict Between Orthodoxy and Direct-Selling Dis-
tribution Channels, 8 LAw & CONTFMP. PRon. 318 (1941).
849 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. S 13(a) (1946).
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for sale" of a commodity, "unless such payment or consideration is
available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers com-
peting in the distribution of such products or commodities"; nor are
services or facilities of a similar variety to be made available by sellers
to purchasers "upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on propor-
tionally equal terms." Hence it would appear that, despite the rule
of equality as to price, all means of economy in the manufacture, sale,
and delivery of goods and all aids to distribution and merchandising
may be employed where feasible and may be reflected in prices and
other terms accorded to particular customers to whose business they
relate, so long as price differentials do not go beyond reflecting actual
savings and so long as services by sellers to buyers and allowances for
services of customers are proportionally available to all who compete
in the same market. In so far as money-saving means of distribution
are employed and the benefits are passed on to subsequent buyers,
consumers will in the end benefit. "Orthodox" channels of distribu-
tion are not protected against the intrusion of alternative methods,
if the latter result in increased efficiency or in services or sales devices
which "pay off."
Two definite exceptions and one which is doubtful emerge in the
statute. One forbids the payment or receipt of any "commission,
brokerage, or other compensation" from one party in a transaction of
"sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise" in interstate com-
merce "to the other party . . . or to an agent, representative, or
other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact
for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of any
party to such transaction other than the person by whom such com-
pensation is so granted or paid."'1 The prohibition is absolute, with-
949 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. S 13(d) and (e) (1946). Paragraph (f) of the
same section makes it unlawful for a purchaser in interstate commerce knowingly to
induce or receive a prohibited discrimination in price.
1049 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1946). This paragraph also contains
a provision apparently permitting all payments or allowances for "services rendered"
in connection with a transaction; but it has been held that this provision refers only
to the services of an independent representative of the person making payment or
allowance, thus avoiding emasculation of the paragraph. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v.
FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940); Biddle Pur-
chasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938); Oliver
Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939). See the Commission's decisions in
National Modes, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 14,323 (FTC 1950); Hesmer, Inc.,
3 CCH TRDE REG. REP. 14,645 (FTC 1951); Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 3 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 1 14,670 (FTC 1951). Cooperative buying organizations estab-
lished by "independents," as well as chain stores and their subsidiary brokerage
concerns, come under the prohibitions of the paragraph. Quality Bakers of America
v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1940); Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v. FTC,
149 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945).
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out reference to the effect of such payments upon competition. Hence,
the payment of brokerage fees or the allowance of equivalent price
reductions to buyers or, for the benefit of buyers, to brokerage concerns
which make direct contact with the seller, dispensing with the employ-
ment of a broker on his part, is forbidden; and consumers are denied
the resulting saving, except as it may be reflected in a general reduc-
tion in the cost of doing business which is passed on to buyers
uniformly. 1
The other definite exception to the permissible reflection of cost
savings in price differentials must be invoked by the Federal Trade
Commission to become operative. The Commission "may, after due
investigation and hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish
quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, as to par-
ticular commodities or classes of commodities, where it finds that
available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render
differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive
of monopoly in any line of commerce," in which event considerations
that otherwise might furnish justification shall not be taken to "per-
mit differentials based on differences in quantities greater than those
so fixed and established." Here then is a provision which confers large
discretion to deny the benefit of distribution cost savings to dealers
whose quantity purchases make them possible and to consumers who
obtain goods through such channels. This disadvantage is to be suf-
fered, if necessary, in order to preserve a competitive system.1 2
The doubtful exception to the principle of permitting cost savings
and merchandising advantages to be reflected in price differentials or
collateral arrangements occurs in connection with situations where
services by sellers to buyers and allowances by sellers for services
rendered by buyers are excluded as to some buyers for practical rea-
sons. For example, the services of a demonstrator supplied by the
seller who operates in customers' stores obviously cannot be made
available except where the potential volume of business promises to re-
imburse the seller for the expense. Yet the statute forbids such services
"Because of these effects, the brokerage provision has been much criticised. Op-
penheim, Administration of the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 8
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 511 (1940); Austern, Section 2(c) in CCH RoBiNSON-PATMAN
AcT SYmposium 37 (1946); Oppenheim, Price and Service Discriminations in CCH
ROBINSON-PATMANi AcT Sym PosIurm 141, 145-46 (1948). See generally Fulda, supra
note 5, at 1094-1103. The only apparent ways around it appear to be for certain
sellers to engage in direct selling only, thus enabling them without discriminating to
accept lower prices than those who employ brokers, or for large purchasers, such as
chain stores, to engage in manufacturing or processing for themselves, thus avoiding
transactions of purchase altogether. See Fulda, supra note 5, at 1103-O5.
2The "quantity-limit" power is contained in a proviso in § 2(a) of the Act.
49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946). It will be discussed further below.
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to be offered "upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on propor-
tionally equal terms."'13 If one dealer sells a fortieth as much of a
product in a ten-hour day as another, must he be offered the services
of a demonstrator for 15 minutes as a condition of the other dealer's
being allowed them for a day? In the alternative, may a minimum
standard be set, which a dealer must meet in order to qualify at all?
Or, if seller and dealer share the expense of demonstration, may the
seller's share be diminished and the dealer's increased in inverse ratio
to the dealer's volume of business? Final answers to these questions
are not yet available, except that advertising allowances proportioned
to volume of business are lawful and that no scheme which excludes
the great preponderance of a seller's customers from benefits available
to some is likely to meet with the acceptance of the Federal Trade
Commission or the courts. 14 It is entirely possible, in consequence,
that sellers may forego furnishing such aids to merchandising, rather
than incur the risk of running afoul of the statute.15 In a recent com-
plaint the Commission has questioned payments by soap manufacturers
to retailers for newspaper advertising of their products, apparently on
the theory that, since only a few retailers with community-wide busi-
ness can use newspaper advertising, such payments are inherently dis-
criminatory.16 Similarly in a recent triple-damage suit for violation
of the Robinson-Patman Act, the district court stated that a price allow-
ance based on alleged economies in the delivery of cans from the manu-
facturer's plant over a runway to the adjoining plant of the customer,
a vegetable packer, was necessarily illegal because it involved a service
that could not be made available to packers whose plants were not
adjoining.1 7 In all such situations, if these views hold, the Act requires
economic advantage to be foregone in the interest of maintaining com-
petitive equality. 8
".49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1946) (emphasis supplied).
14Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1946); Elizabeth Arden, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 283 (1944), enforce-
ment granted, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947). See
Layton, Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Terms in CCH ROBINSON-PATAMAN
AcT S-YmPosium 38 (1948); Montague, "Proportionally Equal Terms" in id. at 51.
2"Violation of the Act may lead to triple-damage suits under § 4 of the Clayton
Act, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1946), as well as proceedings by the
Federal Trade Commission or the Department of Justice. See Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1946).
'GAmended and Supplemental Complaints in Lever Brothers Co., 3 CCH TiRtn
REG. REP. 14,684 (1951).
17Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 484, 498 (W.D. Ark.
1949).
1sSection 2(e) in terms requires the furnishing of services or facilities propor-
tionally to "all purchasers" without explicit reference to competition among pur-
chasers, whereas section 2(d) refers to "customers competing" with each other. The
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Subject to stated exceptions, then, the heart of the Robinson-Patman
Act lies in the policy of allowing (1) such price discriminations
affecting competition, and no others, as can be justified on a basis of
cost savings connected with the transactions in which price concessions
are given and (2) such sellers' services or such payments and allow-
ances for buyers' services, and only such, as are made proportionally
available to all buyers of the same commodities who compete with each
other. Each distributor of goods and, therefore, each alternative channel
of distribution is to be treated with strict justice, to the end that dis-
tributive enterprises may stand or fall on their merits and consumers
may have the benefit of the most efficient or, perchance, enjoy the
satisfaction of contributing to the most alluring. The Act, in other
words, appears to set up a fair field without favors, in which the
"orthodox" distributors may contend for business free of the handicap
of unwarranted discrimination by sellers in favor of their chain-store
rivals, such as the sponsors sought to end.
The Act, however, can operate in accordance with this beguilingly
simple principle only if the scales which it provides can be so read
as to mark clearly the distinctions between situations in which price
or service differentials are permissible and those in which they are not.
The scale of costs connected with transactions and the scale of pro-
portional availability of services or of payments and allowances for
services will now be considered in sequence.
III. THE ADMINISTRABILITY OF THE COST JUSTIFICATION
The use of the actual costs of a given seller which are connected with
various transactions as a measure of the justification for price differ-
entials meets with the possible objections that, in the first place, it
may not be costs which determine prices at all even in the long run 19
and, in the second place, it certainly is not costs alone which determine
prices in particular transactions, affected as they necessarily are by
numerous other market factors. The statute makes a concession to the
second objection by providing that "at any hearing on a complaint"
of discrimination a prima facie case of violation is made by showing
the discrimination but that the seller may rebut "the prima facie case
thus made" by showing that his action was taken "in good faith to
same limitation is, however, regarded as applicable to section 2(e). Kelley, Should
the Law of Section 2 Be Revised- in CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SymPosium 114,
129 (1948). This conclusion may be based on either the legislative intention as
evidenced in the legislative history or the use of the word "discriminate," as dis-
tinguished from "differentiate," in section 2(e) in common with section 2(a).
'
9 See Viner, Cost in 4 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 466 (1931), for a discussion of alternative
economic theories as to the basis of prices.
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meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities
furnished by a competitor."2 Somewhere in the circle of mutually
induced price discriminations one must presumably be found that is
attributable to a seller's cost differentials; but competitive considera-
tions, rather than cost factors, may then control the remainder. As
to the other and more fundamental objection to the statute's reliance
on cost, it may be pointed out that nothing in it ties prices to costs so
long as the former are uniform at any given time or do not vary by
more than the costs involved.2 1
We come, then, to cost as a measure of price differentials where re-
liance is placed upon the cost factor as a justification.
It has been remarked that trials of legality under the Robinson-
Patman Act are "to proceed by the ordeal of cost accountancy." Upon
a "fluctuating mechanism indigenous to business, it is proposed to
establish standards for mercantile justice. ' 22 So "fluctuating," indeed,
is cost accounting "that no positive realistic definition of the term is
possible.1 23 But, clearly, cost accounting, like accounting generally,
is servant and not master; "it is not a set of fixed rules or unbending
principles to be followed without regard to . . . objectives"; and out-
side of the field of regulated transportation and public utility enter-
prises, accounting has, of course, followed "the purposes of the manage-
ment." 24 It has been a serious question from the beginning whether
"costs, which reflect an organic business," can "be subdued into a
weapon of commercial police," so as "to make of discrimination an
objective fact. '25
This "mechanism" of cost accountancy, which requires adaptation
to new purposes under the Robinson-Patman Act, has not been gener-
ally available; for "in a large part of the business world nothing deserv-
ing the name of cost accounts exists.126 Where cost accounts exist,
moreover, their use to justify the actions of a business "before a public
tribunal" requires a degree of accuracy greater than that of the rules
of thumb with which a business man "may be content . . . when he
2049 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1946). This provision has recently
been held to afford a complete defense to the discriminating seller when the requisite
showing is made. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).2 1The Act specifically preserves the legality of "price changes from time to time
* in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability
of the goods concerned. . . ." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
22Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 LAw & CONTFMP. PaoB. 321, 323
(1937).2 3Canning, Cost Accounting in 4 ENCYc. Soc. Scr. 475 (1931).24 Bauer, Accounting in I id. at 404, 412 (1930).
25Hamilton, supra note 22, at 332.
26 CoNFERENCE orN PRicn RasnAcrn, COST BEBAviOR AND ParcE Poucy 285 (1943).
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himself is the only one to use the information";2 7 and this greater
burden may be a heavy one. Furthermore, the initial establishment of
the price differentials that are to be justified under the statute requires
cost forecasts; whereas their subsequent vindication calls for verifica-
tion of the forecasts.2 8 Accountancy, in consequence, must do double
duty, aided, perhaps, by its tendency to have "a precise and final
appeal to legislators and the public, '"2S an appeal which, however, is
not necessarily as potent with the Federal Trade Commission as with
less sophisticated agencies.
There is, indeed, a possible interpretation of the cost-justification
requirement that would render futile the effort to fulfill it by cost
accounting. Complete accuracy as to differences in the cost of supply-
ing commodities would be possible only if separate figures were kept
for each customer or lot of goods-a manifestly impossible task. The
Act could be taken to require no less. Such an interpretation, however,
would be obviously unreasonable. Although attempts at cost justifica-
tion of customer classification may founder on the rock of unduly broad
categories of customers, 30 classes of more than a single customer are
not per se unacceptable. In at least one case the Federal Trade Com-
mission sustained price differentials to customers according to annual
volume of purchases, because of demonstrated differences in the cost
of supplying them.31 Discounts based on reasonable categories of
delivery sizes have been sustained as valid when practically available
to the seller's customers as a whole. Here, however, the reason was
absence of discrimination, rather than conformity to cost differences. 3 2
On the whole, then, the door has been open to realization of the
suggestion that cost accounting might so spread as a result of the
Robinson-Patman Act as to justify calling the statute one "to restore
prosperity to, and thenceforward to safeguard the future of, account-
ants" ;33 for it has remained a governing principle in the enforcement
of the Act that price differentials based upon classifications of cus-
tomers, types of orders, or delivery sizes, even if not equally available
271d. at 27-28, quoting Taggart, The Cost Principle in Minimum Price Regulation,
8 MIcH. BUSINESS STUDIES 151 (1938).
281d. at 22.
291d. at 27.3OHaslett, The Validity of Quantity Discounts in CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT
Symposium 26, 35 (1948).
31Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 381-82, 393-94 (1948),
order set aside, CCH TRADE Ra. REP. 5 62,881 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Freer,
Accounting Problems under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 J. ACCOUNTANCY 480
(1938).32Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537 (1937); American Optical Co., 28
F.T.C. 169, 183 (1939).33Freer, supra note 31, at 481.
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in a practical sense to all competing customers, will be lawful if
adequately supported by cost figures. By all reports, however, the
anticipated development of cost accounting and use of the results in
proceedings under the Act have not taken place; "management, in
general, has not yet devoted the refined attention to distribution costs
required by the act."3' Although the reference is to distribution costs,
rather than costs as a whole, the same statement might be made with
regard to production costs kept in such a way as to furnish a basis
for price differences in sales of a given product. The reason hardly
lies in a general adoption by sellers of a policy of price uniformity,8 '
which would dispense with the legal need for keeping track of costs.
Whether the reason resides in factors inherent in the production and
marketing of goods or will yield to the spur of continued enforcement
of the Robinson-Patman Act is one of the questions calling for attention.
The Act provides that its prohibition of price discrimination shall
not "prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differ-
ences in the cost of manufacture," as well as of sale or delivery, "result-
ing from the differing methods or quantities in which" commodities
are "sold or delivered."s6 Therefore, production cost economies con-
nected with a given order or contract, which occur because the order
is given in advance and is large enough to permit the purchase of the
required material in greater-than-normal quantity, to enable operations
to be planned more efficiently, or to make cheaper bank credit for
the purchase of the material available on the strength of it, may be
reflected in a lower price to the purchaser than is accorded on small-
lot business, provided the savings can be demonstrated and properly
allocated to the particular purchase.5 7 It is this allocation which pre-
34Haslett, Price Discriminations and Their Justifications under the Robinson-
Patman Act of 1936, 46 MIcE. L. REv. 450, 472 (1948). See also Heckert, Coverage
and Cost Provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 31 NAT. Ass'N CosT AcCOUNTANTS
BUzL. 269, 281 (1949); FTC, Case Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting, H. Doc.
No. 287, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941), at 21-22: "The Commission's field survey,
made in pursuance of this inquiry, showed that out of 137 concerns of many types and
sizes, selected because of a probability that they had developed a procedure of distri-
bution cost accounting, only 34 had made any start in this direction and a much
smaller number had made any substantial progress. A considerable number of these
companies which have done little in this direction are large and nationally important
firms." The appendices to the Commission's report contain specific examples of
accounting methods that might accomplish the necessary refinement of distribution
cost accounting, even to the point of allocating costs to specific customers and
orders (cf. text following note 70 infra). See especially pp. 126-30, 136-80, 189-95.
35Cf. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION 162-63, 167-68 (1949); Fulda, supra
note 5, at 1082-1109.
3649 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
37 See United States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 817, 867-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1934), afld, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), for an instance of the practice which received ju-
dicial approval as against a trade-association attempt to curb it. Cf. Fly, The Sugar
Institute Decisions and the Anti-Trust Laws: 2, 46 YAL.n L.J. 228, 242-48 (1936).
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sents the difficulty, since typically goods are manufactured for stock
or to fill an accumulation of orders and no proper basis exists for
allocating more than a proportionate share of the economies of volume
to any of the components which create that volume.3s The problem
has been especially prominent in connection with the allocation of
"fixed," or "overhead," costs (as distinguished from the common costs
of material and of operation just mentioned) among the units of
production.
From the standpoint of the producing enterprise, it may be natural
and proper to refrain from charging as cost to additional business,
which it may be possible to procure at lowered prices, any part or some
fractional part of the prorated overhead cost 39 otherwise allocable to
such business, if that cost has been met or can be met from other
business already in hand or assured. To refrain from entering such
a charge will, indeed, cause the records, as compared to the state of
the books if the additional business were not accepted, to reflect ac-
curately the results of accepting it. If some part of the prorated over-
head can be charged to the additional business and be reflected in the
price charged, the enterprise will gain over the status quo; and if the
gain can be reflected in lowered prices to other customers, all will
benefit despite a price differential in favor of the new business. Cost
accounting which is so conducted as to bring out these factors will
meet the needs of the enterprise.
It by no means follows, however, that cost figures so arrived at
should be accepted in applying the Robinson-Patman Act; for the
standpoint from which the cost justification for price discrimination
must be judged is the over-all legislative, or public policy, standpoint
and not that of the producing enterprise. Here other considerations
come into play. "If the new business represents a true addition to the
social dividend, the interest of the concern making the discrimination
corresponds with that of society. If the new business is merely taken
from competitors (or shifted from the consumption of different goods)
whose costs of production behave in the same way, then there is no
social gain, but merely a loss to the competitors which corresponds to
the private gain made by the business originating the discrimination."'4
'SThe allocation of "joint" and "common" costs to different products manufactured
simultaneously presents an analogous problem. Only arbitrary solutions to it have
been evolved. CONRFRENCE ON PncIC REsEARcH, op. cit. supra note 26, at 172-86.
"SFor this purpose, "overhead" includes interest on borrowed capital, property
taxes, maintenance and managerial expense, depreciation, and any other costs that
continue throughout the accounting period without reference to the volume of
business.
40o. M. Clark, Overhead Costs in 11 ENcYc. Soc. Sc. 511, 512 (1933).
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This loss to competitors, if not subsequently overcome by reprisals on
their part which regain business and nullify the gain of the original
discriminator, leaves the latter correspondingly closer to monopoly
and the former weakened financially or compelled to charge their
customers higher prices on a diminishing volume of business. Perma-
nent social gain can result only if continued growth of the discrimi-
nator does not carry its size beyond that of maximum efficiency and
if it continues to pass on to its customers the resulting economies.
In relation to public utilities, where monopoly pricing is carried on
under public regulation, preferential rates to off-peak traffic or load are
a familiar feature of rate structures, which is usually justified.41 The
shoppers or weekly-pass holders who ride a local transportation sys-
tem at reduced rates mainly during the non-rush hours, and the indus-
trial users of electricity at special rates during the daylight period,
assist in maintaining necessary utility enterprises without carrying
their full proportionate share of the cost burden, and their use of the
facilities represents social gain in so far as it does not weaken other
essential elements of the economy.42 The same reasoning cannot be
transferred to the competitive pricing of commodities.
The intention to forbid unequal allocation of overhead costs to dif-
ferent items of business was clearly expressed in connection with the
passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. In the words of the House com-
mittee report, Section 2(a) "precludes differentials based on imputa-
tion of overhead to particular customers, or exemption of others from
it, where such overhead represents facilitied or activities inseparable
from the seller's business as a whole and not attributable to the busi-
ness of particular customers concerned in the discrimination."' 43 There
appear to be no instances of attempted use of unequal allocation of
manufacturing overhead in proceedings arising under the Act. The
matter has, however, been discussed in the literature, along with
manufacturing costs generally."
4 1TnoxEL, ECONOMICS or PuBLIc UTILITInS 572-78 (1947). The author is critical of
the lengths to which price differentials, amounting often to unjustified discrimination,
have been carried in the utility industry. See also BARNES, THE ECONOMICS or
PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 331-32 (1942).
42The use of natural gas as an industrial fuel, with consequent enhancement of
the depletion of resources and adverse effects upon the coal industry, for example,
raises serious questions.
43H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1936).
4"See Thorp, Possible Effects of the Robinson-Patman Act on Business Practices,
Dun & Brad. Monthly Rev., July, 1936, p. 2; Daughters, Lawful Discrimination
under the Robinson-Patman Act, Dun & Brad. Monthly Rev., Oct., 1936, p. 7; Note,
31 ILL. L. REv. 907, 920 (1937). The Federal Trade Commission had rejected a con-
tention that a large order might properly be charged with less overhead per unit than
small orders in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232, 289 (1936), which arose
under the original Clayton Act.
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Similar problems arise in connection with distribution and sales
expenses. The treatment of these outlays is affected, in addition, by
the absence of a background of cost-accounting experience such as
exists with respect to manufacturing, which has led respondents in
proceedings before the Federal Trade Commission under the Robinson-
Patman Act in several outstanding instances to rely upon ad hoc
surveys in attempting to justify price differences on a cost basis.45 A
long-established cost system would probably have precluded such an
obvious flaw in the allocation of general advertising expense as marred
the attempted justification of a price differential in favor of certain
large gasoline jobbers in the Detroit area, which the Standard Oil
Company of Indiana offered to the Commission. Although these deal-
ers and their retail customers sold the Company's branded gasoline,
none of the cost of advertising that brand and the Company's business
generally, except the cost of service station signs and displays, was
charged to the cost of doing business with these dealers, but all was
assessed against tank-wagon sales to service stations.46
As the Act has worked out, quantity discounts, based on the size
of the individual delivery, are more readily sustainable4 7 than volume
discounts, based on quantities purchased over periods of time.48 The
former have been judged largely on the basis of their practical avail-
ability to all customers when the size of delivery required to earn
them was not excessive.49 Where they are not justified on this basis,
actual cost savings at least equal to the discounts must be shown,50 as
45As to the slow development of distribution cost accounting see the references in
note 34 supra, together with George, The Robinson-Patman Act Begins to Acquire
Meaning, Dun's Rev., Mar., 1940, p. 26; and Longman, Distribution Costs-Present
Methods of Cost Analysis, 70 J. ACCOUNTANCY 431 (1940).
46Standard Oil Co., 41 F.T.C. 263, 278, 281 (1945), rev'd, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
47Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1944), aff'd
as to other points, 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
48American Optical Co., 28 F.T.C. 169 (1939), illustrates both points in a single
proceeding. See also the Commission's opinions in Master Lock Co., 27 F.T.C. 982,
991-92 (1938); H. C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666 (1938). As to volume discounts see
also the cases cited in note 51 infra.
49See note 32 supra. In the Kraft-Phenix case the Commission also found that the
threat to competition, requisite to illegality, was lacking. In Sherwin-Williams Co.,
36 F.T.C. 25 (1943), the Commission seems to have accepted the validity of volume
as well as of quantity discounts, where the annual purchases required to earn them
were small in amount. The Commission found against the respondents because an-
nounced discount schedules were not actually followed in important instances.
50American Maize-Products Co., 32 F.T.C. 901 (1941); cf. Corn Products Refining
Co., 34 F.T.C. 850, 862 (1942), modified, 144 F.2d 211, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1944);
Morton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), modified, 40 F.T.C. 388 (1945), order set aside,
162 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
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is the case also, of course, with volume discounts. 51 Price reductions
in consideration of large orders placed in advance form a third cate-
gory of price differential where, again, cost differences are more
readily possible.52
Justification of price differentials on the basis of costs has been
seriously attempted in relatively few cases. Such attempts were suc-
cessful before the Federal Trade Commission in Bird & Son, Inc.52 and
partially successful-i.e., as to certain volume-discount categories-in
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.- Those in Standard Brands,
Inc.,5 5 Morton Salt Co.," and Standard Oil Co. T were unsuccessful.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., which arose under the Clayton Act
before its amendment by the Robinson-Patman Act and in which the
respondent attempted an elaborate cost justification, the Commission
applied the same principles as those subsequently incorporated into
the amending statute and found itself unable to accept the justifica-
tion.58 The Standard Brands, Standard Oil, and Goodyear cases in-
volved the most elaborate attempts so far made to establish cost justifi-
cations before the Commission. An attempt by the American Can
Company, which it used in defense of triple-damage suits,59 covered a
4Y4-year period; but it related to such indefensibly wide classifications
51Morton Salt Co., supra note 50; American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187
F.9d 919 (5th Cir. 1951); Russellville Canning Co. v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp.
484, 494-97 (W.D. Ark. 1949); H. C. Brill Co., 26 F.T.C. 666 (1938).52United States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1934), afftd,
297 U.S. 558 (1936).
25 F.T.C. 548 (1937).
5444 F.T.C. 351 (1948). The Commission's order as to the discrimination which it
found illegal was set aside on the ground that the requisite threat to competition was
not shown in Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, CCH TnA.nn REG. REP.
62, 881 (7th Cir. 1951).
5530 F.T.C. 1117 (1940).
5639 F.T.C. 35 (1944), modified, 40 F.T.C. 388 (1945), order set aside, 162 F.2d
949 (7th Cir. 1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
5741 F.T.C. 263 (1945), rev'd, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
s22 F.T.C. 232 (1936). Prior to its amendment, the statute contained a proviso
permitting "discriminations in price ... on account of differences in the ...
quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in
the cost of selling or transportation.. . ." (emphasis supplied), instead of, as now,
"due allowance for difference in . . . cost . . . resulting." The order in the Good-
year case was set aside in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939), on the ground that the amount of the dif-
ferences in price that might be based on differences in quantity was not limited by
cost factors. By the time the decision of the court was rendered, the Robinson-
Patman Act had been passed. The Commission's decision, rather than the court's
therefore relates to the statute as it has subsequently stood.
59American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1951).
[VOL. 30
PRICE AND SERVICE DIFFERENTIALS
of customers as to be of no avail regardless of other considerations.60
Standard Brands' elaborate attempt to establish a cost justification
for a schedule of volume discounts on monthly sales of its baker's
yeast broke down largely because several of its fundamental calcula-
tions rested upon the assumption that the cost of distributing this
product amounted to 23% of gross sales and that other percentages
similarly measured the distribution costs of its various other products.
Although this assumption rested upon long experience and had been
used in the Company's previous bookkeeping, it was not supported by
specific data or analysis, and the Commission was unable to accept it.61
The Federal Trade Commission's report of the Morton Salt decision
contains only a brief reference to the Company's attempted cost justifi-
cation, which its trial examiner characterized as "being based upon
estimates, hypotheses, and mere guesses" but which the Commission
fully considered.6 2 In the Standard Oil Co. case two separate types
of cost justification were offered in support of the Company's discrimi-
nation in favor of certain gasoline jobbers in the Detroit area and an
earlier, smaller price discrimination in favor of one of them (which
actually was a chain retailer) before its acquisition of bulk storage
tanks which qualified it for the larger price reduction. One of these
involved a comparison between the cost of handling the business of
other jobbers in Kansas and Oklahoma and the cost of handling non-
jobber, "tank wagon" business in the entire Detroit sales "field,"
embracing much more than the city and its immediate suburbs to
which the controversy related. The failure of the facts adduced to fit
those in dispute was obvious.6 3 The other type of justification involved
an allocation of expenses in Detroit to the classes of customers involved.
Aside from the mis-allocation of advertising expense previously referred
to,6 ' this attempt failed because in relation to the jobbers it again used
the entire Detroit "field" for comparison; and in allocating expenses
to the "tank wagon" retailers it failed to take account of pertinent
oUnder the classification approximately 99% of the American Can Company's
customers received no discount. Discounts began with annual purchases of $500,000,
with 1% allowed on purchases totaling up to $1,000,000. The higher brackets
had spreads of $2,000,000 until $7,000,000 was reached. The discount from that
point up was 5%. In its cost study, however, the Company lumped all its customers
into three groups: those with annual purchases of less than $500,000, those with
purchases of $7,000,000 or more, and those in between.
6
'The cost accounting involved in the case and the Commission's decision are ex-
cellently summarized and commented upon in Taggart, The Standard Brands Case,
21 NAT. Ass'N CosT AccoUNvTATs BuLr. 195 (1939), and Comment, Cost Accounting
Defenses under the Robinson-Patman Act, 35 ILL. L. IRv. 60 (1940).
6240 F.T.C. at 397.
6341 F.T.C. at 278-79.
64See text at note 46 supra.
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differences in the manner of doing business with various ones of them
and charged this group with cost items that should have been spread
over the entire business.65
The Goodyear case involved a series of long-term cost-plus arrange-
ments for the Company's manufacture of Sears, Roebuck & Co.'s pri-
vate brand of tires, which resulted in prices totalling 26% less than
those Goodyear would have charged its trade distributors for the same
products. Although the Commission recognized the validity of price
differentials based on cost and of excluding from the cost of fulfilling
these contracts certain over-all expenses such as advertising which
related to the Company's own brands and of charging these items
wholly to the Company's regular business, 68 it declined to approve the
same treatment of other items, such as losses incurred in operating
Company-owned retail stores,67 or to recognize the "speculative, in-
tangible, and remote" value of an altered distribution of risk, which in
any event did not show up in the profit-and-loss statement in nearly
the amount claimed. 68 The difficulty here related to issues of policy
and not primarily to questions of accounting methods.69 It should be
noted, however, that, along with reduced costs under an arrangement
which did not require the use of the seller's large merchandising
organization, a smaller profit, foregoing the normal profit in the opera-
tion of that organization, would be in order-a factor which the
Federal Trade Commission appears not to have regarded.
The failure of agreement in regard to these major attempts to estab-
lish cost justifications for price differentials, such as could have avoided
the pursuit of adversary proceedings to decisions which rejected one
point of view in favor of another, might seem to indicate either that
business concerns have been unwilling to develop adequate methods
of cost accounting or that cost accounting is inherently an inadequate
tool for settling such problems. Before such conclusions are reached,
however, it should be recognized that questions of policy such as
those in the Goodyear case cannot be resolved by accounting any more
than by other methods of analysis-accounting performs it function
if it reveals the contours of such issues and makes possible clear de-
cisions upon them. Only in the Standard Brands and Standard Oil
cases can it be said that the particular cost-accounting methods, as such,
8541 F.T.C. at 276-77, 280-81.
6622 F.T.C. at 282-85, 328-29.
671d. at 284.
Gsd. at 287.
69The case is well discussed in George, Federal Trade Commission Decision in the
Goodyear Case, Dun & Brad. Monthly Rev., Apr., 1936, p. 12, May, 1936, p. 10, and
June, 1936, p. 4.
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failed; and of course it cannot be said that better methods might not
have been possible and have succeeded. Accounting methods, in fact,
would receive an adequate test only if they were used to establish
price differentials in the first instance, instead of being invoked merely
after the fact to justify discriminations that were set up for other
reasons. Whether competitive business could function in any such
"scientific" fashion is, of course, another matter; but even a solid array
of unsuccessful instances of attempts to establish cost justifications in
legal proceedings 70 would fall short of proving that business is not being
conducted in just such a manner in noteworthy instances that evoke
no official challenge or triple-damage suit. The facts as to such in-
stances will not even emerge in the literature-including that which
describes business practice-unless it relates accounting methods to
the establishment of price differences on a single product. Such self-
revelation on the part of competitive business is rare.
IV. EXACTNESS IN RELATION TO SERVICES AND ALLOWANCES
The decisions with regard to services to buyers and payments or
allowances for services by buyers, under paragraphs 2(d) and (e) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, have continued to require that the avail-
ability of benefits not be restricted to only a few customers and that,
when extended, the benefits be "proportionally equal." Whether mini-
mum conditions for the availability of benefits may be prescribed so
long as they are not too restrictive, and what may be the measure of
proportionality, are questions not yet authoritatively answered,71 since
no cases to test the limits have arisen. Typically, the Commission's
orders have been directed against sellers who have made payments to
selected customers for services such as advertising, counter display,
maintenance of stocks, or other forms of promotion which were not
precisely defined or measured, without offering such payments to
other customers who were equally equipped to earn them or, in some
instances, had actually performed the same services without recom-
pense.7 2 The purpose of the Act and subsequent signs point to the
7OThe array is not solid, of course. Cf. Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937);
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), order set aside, CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 62,881 (7th Cir. 1951).
7lSee text at note 14 supra.
72Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 14,741 (FTC 1951);
Bulova Watch Co., 3 CCH TRADE REO. Rap. 1 14,716 (FTC 1951); Curtiss Candy
Co., 44 F.T.C. 237 (1947); Holzbeierlein & Sons, Inc., 39 F.T.C. 82 (1944); General
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validity of the formulation of the minimum requirement of the Act
in this regard, which has been stated on the basis of the Commission's
dictum in the Elizabeth Arden case 7 8 whereby the service or payment
rendered by a seller must be actually available to "competing dealers"
and these services or payments must be apportioned either equally or
according to some reasonable standard of their relative value in light
of the nature of the services involved or the volume and perhaps the
character of the buyer's business in the purchase and sale of the
seller's product .7
V. THE NET ImpACT OP THE ACT'S STANDAMDS
The Federal Trade Commission in administering the Robinson-
Patman Act as to the possible justification of price and service differ-
tials has applied its terms strictly so as to require these justifications
to operate mathematically or mechanically, with very little room for
the intrusion of qualitative considerations. No clearly adequate tech-
niques of cost accounting, by which to measure price differentials based
on differences in cost, and no entirely precise or complete test of the
validity of service differentials, have emerged. The Commission's
Trade Practice Conference Rules, by which about 200 industries are
now governed, although they frequently contain prohibitions of price
and service discriminations, afford no greater guidance, for they simply
repeat with monotonous regularity the language of the statute.75 The
Commission's Digest of Cease and Desist Orders also gives no clues,
since the pertinent portions simply cite the Commission's decisions
under cryptic headings. TM
In applying the statute strictly the Commission has proceeded in
accordance with its purpose." By excluding inexact measures of justifi-
Baking Co., 38 F.T.C. 307 (1944); Binney and Smith Co., 32 F.T.C. 315 (1940).
See also American Co-operative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907
(7th Cir. 1946).
7339 F.T.C. 288, 302 (1944).
74Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e) in CCH ROBiNSON-PATmAx ACT Symposium. 55,
72 (1946). See also the more detailed suggestions in OPPENHEIM, PRcE AND SEmV-
xcE DSCRImiNATiONS UNDER TrE RoBINSorf-PATmAx ACT 51-52 (1949), summarized
from FrnMAN AND ZORN, RoBmNsON-PATmAN ACT: ADVERTISING AND PRoMoTzoNA
ALLowANcEs (1948).
75The Rules are set forth in 16 CODE FED. REis. § 17.1 et seq. (1949).
7616 CODE FED. BEGs. § 3.685 et seq. (1949).
7"The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act has been heavily drawn
upon in discussions of the various provisions of the Act, such as those in the CCH
Robinson-Patman Act Symposia (1946-1949), and in AusTIN, PRICE DIsCRIMiNATioN
AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1950). Portions of it
are reproduced in OPPENHEIM, UNPAIR PrACTICE-CASES, CoMmENTs AND MATERIALS
1003-11 (1950), and substantial portions are set forth in 1 CCH TRADE RnE. REP.
1 2211-47 (1948).
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cation for price and service differentials it has avoided the obstacles
to enforcement, to which a contrary interpretation would give rise.
Its method, coupled with the burden of proof resting upon respond-
ents,7 18 has resulted in very few decisions on the merits in favor of
respondents, although a large number of dismissals "without prejudice"
have been entered for reasons not definitely stated but which may
include lack of substance to the charges in the light of some degree of
consideration of the merits.79
One possible escape from some of the rigor of the Commission's
interpretation of the Act has lain in the continued recognition which
has been given to the legality of a seller's classifying his customers
according to their business "functions," such as manufacturing, whole-
saling, retailing, etc., and setting different prices for the various classes.
Although this practice may be carried on under circumstances which
render price cuts to a class of purchasers an illegal threat to the com-
petition of the seller's competitors with him, 0 such price differentials
are not ordinarily illegal on the ground that competition among the
buyers of different classes who receive different prices is threatened,
since the members of the various classes do not compete with each
other. Hence it is not necessary to justify the differentials on a cost
basis.8' If a purchaser carries on different functions with relation to
different units of the commodities purchased, it is only necessary to
apply the appropriate price to the units actually handled in each way,
78Paragraph 2(b) of the Act provides that "Upon proof being made, at any hearing
on a complaint under this section, that there has been discrimination in price or
services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus
made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of
this section, and unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is
authorized to issue an order terminating the discrimination. . . ." 49 STAT. 1526
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1946). As to the further provision of this same paragraph
see note 20 and accompanying text supra.
79House Select Committee on Small Business, Preliminary Report on Antitrust
Law Enforcement, H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1951). The dis-
missals are reported in the volumes of F]C decisions. Some dismissals are caused by
abandonment of the practices charged. That in Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co., 40 F.T.C.
738 (1945), however, came after "further consideration of . . . respondent's justifi-
cation . . . on the basis of different service costs. .. ."
8oSuch price cuts, by taking business away unjustifiably from the competitors,
would conflict with the purpose of the original Clayton Act. It is on this ground
alone that discrimination in favor of manufacturers as to a commodity which they
incorporate into their own product, without discrimination among them, may become
illegal. See S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 F.2d 415 (6th Cir.
1925); General Motors Corp., 3 CCH TAADE REG. RaP. 14,098 (FTC 1948) (still
pending); Champion Spark Plug Co., 3 CCH TRAD RaG. REP. 2212.5601 (FTC
1948) (still pending).
s8See generally Schniderman, "The Tyranny of Labels"-A Study of Functional
Discounts under the Robinson-Patman Act, 60 HAv. L. Rav. 571 (1947); Van Cise,
Functional Prices in CCH ROBnIsoN-PATmAN AcT SY'xposIt-m 89 (1947).
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charging the wholesaler's price on goods resold at wholesale, the re-
tailer's price on goods resold at retail, etc.8 2 It has been assumed in
accord with the legislative intent that alleged discrimination in relation
to a purchaser like a chain store, if it carried out both wholesaling and
retailing functions as to the same goods, would be judged in relation to
sales to those other purchasers who sold, not bought, goods in the same
manner as the chain, thus requiring a cost justification for any price
disadvantage to other retailers. 3 By using the opportunity for price
discrimination among "functional" classes of customers, a seller may
favor one channel of distribution for his product over another. Two
qualifications to this statement must be made, however: (1) the seller
may not maintain relations with retailers who buy from his wholesale
customers so as to make them in effect his own customers, and at the
same time sponsor price differentials between them and retailers who
buy directly from -the seller;"' and (2) according to the Federal Trade
Commission's view as modified by the court of appeals in the Standard
Oil case, the seller may not give his wholesalers a price advantage with
knowledge that they pass it on in part to their retailer customers and
that these retailers undersell competing retailers who buy directly from
the principal seller at higher prices.8 5 If this view should be accepted,
a producer would virtually be obliged to maintain equality among the
prices charged for his product to distributors at each marketing level,
no matter by what channel his product reached each level, if he sold
through different channels and maintained functional price differ-
ences.s6 He might, however, sell at uniform prices to all classes of
8 2The Inoculator cases, 26 F.T.C. 296, 303, 312, 320 (1938>, embody this view
clearly. See also American Oil Co., 29 F.T.C. 857 (1939).
83Schniderman supra note 81, at 586-88.84See Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 F.T.C. 537, 546 (1937).
s5173 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1949). The decision on this point rests on the provision of
the Robinson-Patman Act that price discrimination is unlawful when not specifically
justified, not only where its effect "may be substantially to lessen competition," but
also where its effect may be "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
The decision was reversed in 340 U.S. 231 (1951). The case had three facets: (1)
the Company's attempted cost defense, which the Commission rejected and the courts
did not review (see text at note 63 supra); (2) the question here discussed, which was
not reached in the Supreme Court; and (3) the question decided in the Supreme
Court (see note 20 supra), whether it is a complete defense against a charge of
otherwise unjustified discrimination that the seller acted in good faith to meet "an
equally low price of a competitor." Since the Court held that it was such a defense
and the Commission had not considered it, the case was remanded for the Commission
to consider this question on the facts.
s
8 This obligation would rest upon him only in so far as he knew or should have
known that price cutting was going on. The situations would be few, however,
in which price cutting that was more than sporadic would be unknown to him,
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purchasers,8 ' or he might choose to sell through one channel of distri-
bution only, thus eliminating others altogether."'
The possibility has been envisaged that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion might be led by the logic of its reasoning to pass on the size of
functional differentials8 9 Recently it seems to have been feared in
trade channels, as a result of developments in the Commission's han-
dling of the spark plug cases, 90 that it might do away with functional
discounts in at least some situations. As a result the Commission felt
impelled to give assurance in a press release containing a letter sent
by the director of its Bureau of Antimonopoly that it was not opposed
to functional discounts as such. It appears that, rather, the particular
functional classification used by the spark plug manufacturers may
be at fault.'
Closely related to dissatisfaction with the Commission's handling of
the functional discount problem is a recently intensified unhappiness
over its judgments with regard to that injury to competition which is
necessary to render price discrimination among purchasers in inter-
state commerce illegal. It is said, for example, that the Commission
has confused injury to competitors with injury to competition and has
overlooked the greater evil because of preoccupation with the lesser.9 2
In the Standard Oil situation, for example, we are told that it would
be far better to allow price competition among alternative channels
of distribution (the Company itself as a wholesaler on the one hand
and the jobbers on the other hand), even though some retailers might
be temporarily injured, than to choke off such" competition by a cease-
and-desist order for the purpose of protecting these retailers. More
pertinent here, however, is the question of what foundation must exist
in a record for a Commission finding that competition (whether in
since complaints would promptly be made. If the Robinson-Patman Act is so in-
terpreted, it of course comes in conflict with the Sherman and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts except, perhaps, in situations to which the Miller-Tydings Amendment
applies (see Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 [1951]),
since both resale price-maintenance agreements between seller and buyer and thor-
oughgoing efforts by the former to control the resale prices of buyers are illegal
under these acts. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., supra; FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).87Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937).
88The right to select one's customers "in bona fide transactions and not in restraint
of trade" is expressly preserved by a proviso in paragraph 2(a) of the Robinson-
Patman Act. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
89Van Cise, supra note 81, at 97.
90See note 80 supra.91See the FTC printed summary of press releases for the week ended Dec. 2, 1950.
92Cf. STOCKING AND WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRIsE 374 (1951); ED-
wARDs, MAzNTAiNING COMPETITION 167-69 (1949).
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some general sense or in the sense of continued business health on the
part of one or more competitors) actually is threatened with injury
by a given price discrimination. In the early Kraft-Phenix case the
Commission concluded that price differentials which were reasonably
available to all customers, even though not all took advantage of them,
did not have the effect on competition that would render them illegal.
It further pointed out that so many other factors than a few cents'
variation in the cost of packages of cheese affected the selling prices
and business success of retailers that it would be unrealistic, without
specific evidence of injury, to attribute substantial effect upon com-
petition to such variations.93 At the time of that decision the Commis-
sion assumed the burden of establishing injury to competition as part
of the prima facie case of "discrimination" which it had to make in
order to shift the burden of establishing a defense to the respondent.
Later it took the view that it was enough to establish a prima facie
case for the Commission to show the existence of a price differential
by a seller in interstate commerce, together with the existence of com-
petition.9' By the same token the conclusion that there was injury to
competition would follow at the end of a proceeding unless an adequate
showing was made that there was not. In the recent Morton Salt9" and
Minneapolis-Honeywell" cases, accordingly, injury to competition was
found even though the facts were in many respects analogous to those
in the Kraft-Phenix case,97 upon the theory that a financial advantage
accruing to one or more competitors over others in the 'same market
constitutes a threat to the competitive strength of the latter. The Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which overruled the Commission
in the Morton Salt case,98 had its action in turn reversed by the Su-
preme Court in a decision which concluded.'that, "It would greatly
handicap effective enforcement of the Act to require testimony to show
that which we believe to be self-evident, namely, that there is a
9325 F.T.C. 537, 545 (1937).
94The evolution of the Commission's views is traced in Austern, Required Com-
petitive Injury and Permitted Meeting of Competition in CCH RoBiNSON-PATMA.
AcT SymiMosIum 63 (1947).95Morton Salt Co., 39 F.T.C. 35 (1944), modified, 40 F.T.C. 388 (1945).
96Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), order set aside,
CCH TRADE E . REP. 62,881 (7th Cir. 1951).
91In Morton Salt, the carload discount, which was the one in controversy in this
connection, was, like the favorable prices in Kraft-Phenix, made quite generally
available-in this instance, by encouraging pooling arrangements among purchasers;
and the item to which it related was one of many on the shelves of retail purchasers.
In Minneapolis-Honeywell, as in Kraft-Phenix, but to a more striking extent, there
was an absence of correlation between the price differentials on respondent's heat-
control devices and the price differences on the furnaces made or assembled by
various purchasers, into which the devices went.
98162 F.2d 949 (7th Cir. 1947).
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'reasonable possibility' that competition may be adversely affected by
a practice under which manufacturers and producers sell their goods
to some customers substantially cheaper than they sell like goods to
the competitors of these customers," and that the evidence and the
Commission's finding of actual injury to competition went beyond what
was necessary.9 9 In the later Minneapolis-Honeywell caseloo the Seventh
Circuit, encouraged by the intervening reversal of the Commission in
the Standard Oil decision and by the enlarged scope of review of
administrative findings which it deemed the Universal Camera de-
cision"1' to have opened up, again concluded that the Commission's
finding of injury to competition was inadequately supported.
If the principles of the Morton Salt decision continue to prevail,
the strict administration of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act
relating to the justification of price and service discrimination will be
reinforced by virtual closing of the door to a showing of absence of
resulting injury to competition. Whether the defense of good-faith
meeting of competition will be more readily available in a practical
sense remains to be seen. 1 2 Unless a fairly ready loophole is provided
by this means, the statute will be more clearly enforceable in cease-
and-desist proceedings than it has ever been before. In so far as the
statutory purpose can actually be achieved by means of such proceed-
ings, the Commission and the courts will have forged an effective
policy-executing weapon, fittingly taking their cue as to policy from
the statute.
VI. FUTURE PROTECTION TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Evidence is lacking that the Robinson-Patman Act has had the effect
on any large scale of inducing the adoption by business of refined
cost-accounting techniques or equitably-devised plans for service to
99334 U.S. 37, 50 (1948).
lOOMinneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 62,881
(7th Cir. 1951).
0'"Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). In the Minneapolis-
Honeywell, as in the Universal Camera, case the administrative agency substituted
its own finding for a contrary finding of its trial examiner. To do so where it appears
from the record that the examiner's finding is supported by a preponderance of the
evidence is, said the Seventh Circuit, "arbitrary."
102A pending legislative proposal, which would cement the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in the Standard Oil case into statute, would add that "a seller shall not be deemed
to have acted in good faith if he knew or should have known that the lower price or
more extensive services or facilities which he met were in fact unlawful." S. 719,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). This bill was passed by the Senate on August 2, 1951.
97 Cong. Rec. 9660-61 (Aug. 2, 1951). It also deals with the basing-point, or de-
livered-price, problem. Even with such legislation, the Commission must continue
to judge in the first instance whether the defense has been established.
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customers or allowances to customers, such as would achieve the goal
of fair competitive opportunity for all forms of distributive enterprises
and of maximum efficiency in service to consumers. The Federal Trade
Commission has found the statute to afford effective bases for issuing
orders to strike down price and service discriminations. The indica-
tions are, however, that business has either gone its way, giving rela-
tively little attention to the statute and its interpretation, which have
not yielded clear guides for precise adaptation to legal requirements,
or has abandoned many, perhaps justifiable, price differentials and aids
to distribution rather than run the risk of colliding with the law.
The dissatisfactions that gave rise to the Act continue to be ex-
pressed, with resulting proposals for supplementary legislation and for
strengthened administration.10 3 The demand for rigorous measures
against discrimination is far less powerful than during the Great De-
pression; but its continuance is some indication, along with the con-
tinued need for enforcement proceedings, that the Act has been less
than fully effective. Quite clearly, competitive business, aside from
situations in which an organized exchange or a fairly-conducted com-
petitive bidding system sets the framework, proceeds by means of
ceaseless searching for opportunity and for advantage, followed by
arrangements which secure the advantage in specific situations for
greater or less periods of time. Prices are determined on a basis of
custom modified by "hunches" or by intuitive judgments which take
account of a host of imponderables."' To endeavor to impose "scien-
10 3The report of the House Select Committee on Small Business, on Monopolistic
and Unfair Trade Practices, H.R. REP. No. 2465, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), con-
tains both a summary of the testimony before a subcommittee at earlier hearings and
certain of the Committee's own comments and proposali. Unhappiness over price dis-
crimination by suppliers was expressed by representatives of small shoe repair shops,
independent tire dealers, and retail druggists. The Committee expressed its approval of
a proposal to require sellers in interstate commerce to maintain records of their price
systems open to inspection. Id. at 26. The same Committee's later report on Anti-
trust Law Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division,
Department of Justice, H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951), contains an
analysis of the Commission's methods. Aside from recommendations for the elimina-
tion of delays and failure to enforce its decrees on the part of the Commission, the
Committee recommended that orders under the Clayton Act, like those under the
Federal Trade Commission Act as amended, be made enforceable by suits for penal-
ties and that the Commission be given power to extend cease-and-desist orders to
other firms than a particular respondent, that the Commission be empowered to in-
clude affirmative requirements in its orders, and that it receive authority to issue
general regulations applicable to entire industries. Id. at 28-30.
'
0 4Gordon, supra note 3. See also the accounts of pricing in selected industries
contained in HAMILTON, PRICE- AND PRICE POUCIES (1938). The concluding chapter,
which summarizes "The Politics of Industry," is a classic statement. ". . . [P]rice-
and the costs which attend it-are a pecuniary reflection of the usages which im-
pinge upon the making and marketing of a good. These usages . . . are embedded
[VOL. 30
PRICE AND SERVICE DIFFERENTIALS
tific" determinations upon those who are habituated to such a system
is to undertake an all but impossible task'.
If success could be achieved, its burden might be heavy indeed, in
terms both of price rigidity and of protection to inefficient methods of
distribution. Competent testimony is in substantial accord to the effect
that "administered" prices, which sellers announce and change in their
discretion, are resistant to open, uniform reduction because of fear
of "spoiling the market" for the future and of desire to exploit con-
tinued full-price opportunities even if concessions must be made to
gain or hold other business. Hence, in periods when prices may decline,
they are likely to be "softened" through discriminatory concessions to
some buyers. In so far as the Robinson-Patman Act operates to prevent
such discriminations, it is likely to be a force for keeping prices up?10
To a considerable extent, also, the rule of non-discrimination is one
which fastens more securely upon consumers than otherwise the high
prices which at least sometimes go with demand stimulated by adver-
tising. The effect of the Minneapolis-Honeywell decision of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission,'"8 for example, as the Commission's report
shows, is mainly to enforce the due distribution of opportunity to share
in a premium price built up by advertising. Although it is true that
by removing his brand and charging all of his current advertising
expense to other sales the manufacturer might work out a cost justifi-
cation for a price differential, such a method is often hardly practicable.
It seems highly questionable in any event whether the mechanism of
federal enforcement should be directed to no more substantial end
than to distribute sellers' benefits from advertising equitably, so long,
at least, as overweening monopoly power has not been built up. r' 7 A
better policy would be, rather, to encourage distribution which dispenses
with such costs; and it may not be feasible in many instances to insist
upon complete elimination of the effects of previous advertising as a
condition of doing so. So long as alternative sources of supply are
in the ways of an industry just as the folkways are embedded in the culture of a
primitive or a civilized people. Each of these customs . . . has a capacity for devel-
opment or regression, is modified by the endless series of transactions which it helps
to envelop, and may be called upon to give way to an alternative." Id. at 542-43.
lOSThorp, Possible Effects of the Robinson-Patman Act on Business Practices, Dun
& Brad. Monthly Rev., July, 1936, p. 5; EDWARDS, MArITAiNING CoMPETITIoN 162
(1949).
lorMinneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948).
1o7There is, of course, limited monopoly power incident to "monopolistic compe-
tition" built up by advertising and other means of attaching business to a given
enterprise with some degree of assurance of its continuance. The regulation of
monopoly, however, can and should be adapted to the various kinds and degrees of
monopoly which are known to exist.
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reasonably available, purchasers of commodities for resale should be
encouraged so far as at all possible to discover substitutes for submis-
sion on their part to unsatisfactory pricing by suppliers, as the "volun-
tary" chains and locally-owned supermarkets have to a large extent
done.108 Public-utility concepts are hardly applicable. By the same
token, the privilege of participating equitably in the advertising itself
through "services" or payment for them is perhaps not so indispensable
as to require legislative regulation for its accomplishment.
Current consideration of possible measures for improving the Govern-
ment's handling of the price and service discrimination problem is
disappointingly unproductive of proposals of a fundamental nature.
Outright repeal of some of the most significant aspects of the Robinson-
Patman Act has been suggested, partly because of Judge Lindley's
expressed doubt in the A & P case "whether we ever needed" the Act,
"with all its elusive uncertainty"; 1 9 but there is no great force behind
the suggestion, and it has not been made with recognition of the
numerous difficulties that would remain unsolved. Proposals for im-
provement in details of the statute have been numerous and mainly
meritorious." 0 Active legislative consideration has been given, on the
one hand, to proposals for strengthening enforcement of the existing
policy of the Act 1 and, on the other hand, to measures that would
render enforcement more difficult, which court decisions have pro-
vided the occasion for promoting.1 2 The existing policy and its admin-
istration have not been reexamined, however, with a view to devising
new measures for realizing its valid elements while sloughing off those
that are invalid.
It seems clear that the evil which is sought to be reached by the
Robinson-Patman Act and which requires lkgislation supplementary
to the Sherman Act because that Act does not reach it is the victimiza-
tion of distributors, usually small distributors, in situations where the
number of suppliers with whom they can deal is quite limited, by
"o
8 See Fulda, supra note 5, passim. In some lines of business, such as the shoe
repair trade, where most enterprises are extremely small and the personnel hardly
in a position to display originality and co-operativeness, special protective measures
may become necessary.
"o9United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 676 (E.D.
Ill. 1946), afl'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
11See articles in CCH ROBiNsoN-PATmAN AcT SYixPosIum (1948), cited in OPPEN-
HEim, PaCiE AND SEivicE DIscEixNAToN UNDER THE ROBiNSON-PATMAN AcT 62
(1949).
"'See note 103 supra. S. 1544, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), would, in addition
to amending the antitrust laws in other ways, require sellers to make known to all
customers and available to them on the same terms, all terms of sale offered to any
one of them.
222See note 102 supra.
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discriminatory practices on the part of those suppliers. These practices
may result primarily either from the initiative of these suppliers in
the struggle for business among them or from the pressure of powerful
buying organizations. In the first type of situation the Sherman Act
provides traditional remedies which either the Government or injured
suppliers can invoke; and the Government has been successful under
that Act in the A & P case 3 in the second type of situation. Relief
through these channels is likely to be uncertain and slow, however,
and in the meanwhile the injured small distributors remain sub-
stantially remediless in the absence of some supplementary corrective
action or means of redress. It should be possible to provide relief in
this type of situation without imposing mechanical rules which are
difficult of enforcement on distribution generally and, in the process,
without giving shelter to wasteful and inefficient methods of marketing.
It is believed that relief of a discriminating type might be provided
if the rule-making power of the Federal Trade Commission, for which
the Robinson-Patman Act provides a slight beginning, were enlarged
and guided by suitable statutory terms.
The present rule-making provision of the Robinson-Patman Act re-
lates only to the setting of "quantity limits," which the Commission
may establish after due investigation and hearing as to any commodity
or class of commodities, "where it finds that available purchasers in
greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account
thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line
of commerce." When the Commission has done so, price differentials
based on differences in quantities greater than those specified by the
Commission will not be permitted."' Only since World War II has
the Commission proceeded under this provision, and no limits have as
yet been finally prescribed. The pending proceeding relates to the
rubber tire industry. In its Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the Com-
mission indicated that it had in mind establishing a carload lot of
tires as the largest amount on which a discount because of quantity
could be allowed. 115 While such a rule might be desirable in the rubber
tire industry, the carload limit on railroad rate concessions on account
of quantity, which the Interstate Commerce Commission has main-
tained under the Interstate Commerce Act and to which the Federal
Trade Commission alluded, 1 6 hardly constitutes a persuasive analogy.
"'1United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.I11.
1946), affTd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
11449 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946).
31514 FED. RE . 6044 (1949).
116bid.
19511
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
It would certainly be unfortunate if quantity limits in industries that
became subject to rules on that subject were to be frozen into a carload
formula. Yet the mere power to set quantity limits is not a sufficiently
flexible regulatory device to enable the Commission to do appreciably
better.
What is needed instead is a statute in place of the Robinson-Patman
Act which provides in effect that the Commission may, after investiga-
tion and hearing, issue regulations as to differences in price on account
of quantity, allowances for services by buyers, or services by sellers to
buyers, in respect to the sale of any commodity or class of commodities
in interstate commerce, with regard to which the Commission finds
that discriminations in prices, service allowances, or services exist and
that the available sources of supply to buyers in any market or mar-
kets are so few and are coupled with such prevalence of discriminatory
practices as to cause these buyers to encounter substantial difficulty
in competing on an equal basis. Freed from preoccupation with the
practices of individual sellers, the Commission might then devote its
energies to appraising significant market situations involving dis-
crimination and to devising suitable remedies to preserve competition
in distribution without underwriting existing wasteful practices. Its
regulations might, when feasible, specify cost bases for price differ-
ences, together with cost accounting methods for administering them,
rather than simply stating rigid quantity limits-although these need
not be excluded when appropriate. The regulations might be nation-
wide in operation or be confined to geographical areas in which harm-
ful discriminations, growing out of interstate commerce, existed. For
much American distribution, regulations would be unnecessary, since
alternative sources of supply are coupled with sufficient opportunities
for distributors to develop new methods, so that healthy competition
may be maintained without regulatory intervention.
The success of any such approach would, of course, depend upon a
tradition and methodology in the regulating agency and a willingness
on the part of Congress to support such an approach, sufficient to
enable the agency actually to keep in touch with market situations
resulting from interstate commerce and to devise realistic measures for
the correction of unhealthy conditions. Such a state of affairs perhaps
.awaits the millenium; but in the meanwhile there is need for sugges-
tions to improve the present situation.
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